

## Prospectus

### *Introduction*

In retrospect, the pikes in the Thirty Years' War exhibit in the Heeresgeschichtliche Museum in Vienna shouldn't have surprised me, but they did. Some twenty of them, set upright in their frame like folded umbrellas in the world's largest umbrella stand, they must have been more than three times my height, around 20 feet long, with tapering shafts as thick around at the base as my circled thumb and forefinger; their iron spearheads, blurry at this distance, were tiny in comparison. Handling one of these things—let alone spearing someone with any degree of precision—would have been like sticking a needle into a target with a pole-vaulter's rod; I could not do it without some form of training and intensive practice.

However, early formulations of the theory of the Military Revolution rested on the implication that the rise of a new kind of drill and tactics in the late 16th century replaced not another kind of pedagogy, but a lack of system altogether. In this analysis, older forms of tactical organization, such as the pike squares known to history as *tercios* after the Spanish word for them, relied more on herd mentality than on trained skill.<sup>1</sup> Thus, the introduction of modern tactics and drill was not only an improvement in military effectiveness, it also signaled a decisive step on the road to progress. Arguments about the importance of drill and discipline have also had a wide resonance outside military history, grounding wider discussions of social discipline,

---

<sup>1</sup> Michael Roberts, "The Military Revolution, 1560-1660," in *Essays in Swedish History*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967.

state formation, and confessionalization in the early modern period: not only were soldiers drilled and controlled, but civilians were as well, becoming good subjects of the newly-absolute monarchs or good believers of increasingly intrusive denominations.<sup>2</sup> Whether implicitly or explicitly, many of these discussions either rely on arguments about the military revolution in drill or refer to the military as a model. However, these lines of thought have several flaws, which my research aims to address.

These arguments gloss over the period of time between the advocacy of the new drill and discipline around the turn of the 17th century or earlier and their wide adoption only after the Thirty Years' War, more than fifty years later. In the first half of the 17th century, most (non-French) soldiers were members of mercenary companies, which trained and governed their own members, much like contemporary guilds;<sup>3</sup> it was only with the post-Thirty-Years'-War decline of mercenary bands that authorities in the German-speaking world were able to fully implement not only the new drill, but also a more general program of social discipline among soldiers. While it remains the case that the desire to implement a project and the fulfillment of that project are not the same thing, if the supposed paradigm of social discipline, the military, was not in fact brought to heel in Germany until late in the 17th century, it would appear that the chronology of social discipline is less straightforward than it would appear, with hard nodes of resistance existing alongside the advance of discipline.<sup>4</sup> While my work will focus primarily on the culture

---

2 The so-called "confessionalization thesis," which states that religious identity in Germany is primarily a result of a program by the state and church to enforce religious and political unity through a top-down program of social discipline, was first promulgated by Heinz Schilling and Wolfgang Reinhard. For an influential articulation of the thesis in English, see Po-Chia Hsia, *Social Discipline in the Reformation: Central Europe 1550-1750*, Routledge, 1992. Recently, this thesis has been critiqued, with newer publications utilizing *Alltagsgeschichte* to point out the porosity of confessional boundaries (Kaspar von Greyerz, Manfred Jakubowski-Tiessen, Thomas Kaufmann, Hartmut Lehmann. *Interkonfessionalität - Transkonfessionalität - binnenkonfessionelle Pluralität: Neue Forschungen zur Konfessionalisierungsthese*. Heidelberg: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2003).

3 For German mercenaries, Fritz Redlich's *The German Military Enterpriser and his Work Force: A study in European economic and social history* (1964) is still unsurpassed.

4 This is similar to the conclusions reached by recent research on confessionalization.

and society of soldiers themselves, it therefore has wider implications for discussions of historical change and contingency.

To my knowledge, there currently exists no full account in the German historical field of the period between the Thirty Years' War, the last heyday of the mercenary band, and the Nine Years' War (1688-1697), which saw the first large-scale implementation of national standing armies. This period is not only significant for the implementation of the new drill but for a general pattern of increasing social discipline: during this period, armies changed from independent agents to servants of the state; wages (and the social status of soldiers) dropped, but pay became more regular, so that soldiers did not need to rely primarily on plunder for their livelihood; soldiers grew separated from civilians in daily life, but came to be regarded as the protectors of the polity rather than the enemy of all civilians regardless of allegiance; the number of women and children traveling with armies dropped; military service became less of a part-time job and more of a long-term career; and a class of non-commissioned officers, whose job it was to train, direct, and observe the troops at a granular level, developed. In short, this period saw the birth of ways of life which are characteristic of the modern army, and yet we do not know the effect these changes had on the daily lives and affective relationships of soldiers themselves, or whether they resisted them. My proposed dissertation, therefore, has relevance not only for military history, for which technical and tactical changes in the early modern period are a perpetual controversy, but also in the area of social history.

### *Literature Review and Argument*

In his seminal 1956 article *The Military Revolution, 1560-1660*, Michael Roberts described the Military Revolution as the result of the tactical and disciplinary changes introduced

by Maurice of Nassau and best exemplified by Gustavus Adolphus. Among other reforms for cavalry and artillery, Maurice introduced linear formations for infantry, smaller and thinner than the “massive, deep, unwieldy squares of the Spanish *tercio*,” and intricate parade-ground maneuvers.<sup>5</sup> These tactical changes necessitated a strict and detailed regimen of drill, in which the complicated activities of loading and firing a musket, for instance, were broken down into their component steps. According to Roberts, this was a much higher standard of training than participation in a *tercio* demanded, requiring greater training, a higher level of skill, and better morale.<sup>6</sup> The Dutch military reforms were a “science,” which was appealing not only because it would allow for more efficient utilization of firepower, but also—perhaps more so—because it was based on classical models, possessing a powerful aura of rationality.<sup>7</sup>

While these changes were tactical in nature, Roberts argues that they necessitated wider developments. The pre-Thirty-Years’-War regiment of mercenaries has been compared to a missile, insofar as it was big, expensive, and single-use only; regiments would be recruited in spring, or for a single campaign, then payed off and disbanded at the end of the campaign or in the fall. Year-round service was instituted, at least by the Imperial armies and the Dutch, in the early 17th century, and one of the reasons Roberts cites for this development is that the winter, in which soldiers remained enlisted but not on campaign, could be spent on training; he claims that the modern standing army arose from this practice.<sup>8</sup> He also traces the rise in army size during this period to the new tactical developments, insofar as the new focus on battle they supposedly

---

5 Michael Roberts, “The Military Revolution, 1560-1660,” in *Essays in Swedish History*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967, 196-197

6 *Loc. cit.*

7 The deep classical influence on this line of thought may be seen quite clearly in the *Kriegsbuch* of Count John VII of Nassau-Siegen, Maurice’s cousin, which quotes Vegetius, Aelian, and Leo intensively in the original; incidentally, our modern vocabulary of military command has come down almost unaltered from Aelian, through the Dutch reformers. (*Die Heeresreform der Oranier: Das Kriegsbuch des Grafen Johann von Nassau-Siegen*, ed. Werner Hahlweg. Wiesbaden, 1973. See also “The Military Revolution, 1560-1660,” 197).

8 “The Military Revolution, 1560-1660,” 201

enabled allowed Gustavus Adolphus to give free rein to his pan-European strategy, the wider scope of warfare during the Thirty Years' War necessitating in turn a corresponding increase in the size of armies, and therefore an expansion of state authority and bureaucratic administration.<sup>9</sup> Here, Roberts adumbrated in miniature what came to be known later as the "fiscal-military" explanation of the rise of the modern state, in which the growth of armies drove the development of bureaucratic absolutism.<sup>10</sup> This thesis remains important, and I do not seek to contest it. In contrast to later explanations, which described the development of the state as a function of the resource extraction necessary to fund expanding wars,<sup>11</sup> Roberts explains both the rise of the state and the expansion of warfare as a function of the military revolution in tactics and the new type of drill. In a neat reflection of later discussions of social discipline and governmentality, discipline thus turns up at the very center of Roberts' account of the early modern state.

Indeed, the concept of the Military Revolution is one of the few developments in military history which has found wide resonance outside the ivory bunker, becoming integrated into social and economic history as well as political theory. While Roberts' thesis itself has been challenged, historians dealing with the early modern military have never lost sight of the need to ground discussions of military developments within their social and economic context. As Clifford Rogers points out, the Military Revolution is therefore important historiographically as well as historically, since it has brought military history to the attention of the historical community as a whole.<sup>12</sup>

---

9 *Ibid.*, 203-208

10 Thomas Ertman, "Rethinking Political Development in Medieval and Early Modern Europe." Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Meeting, New York, 1994

11 See, for example, Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States* (1990) and Brian Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change* (1992).

12 Clifford J. Rogers. "The Military Revolution in History and Historiography," in *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe*, Westview Press, 1995, p.p. 2-3

However, Roberts' account of the rise of modern drill is radically simplified: the old is defeated by the new, armies either adopt linear tactics or face defeat, and the lack of absolutism in Sweden and the Netherlands, seedbeds of the new drill that supposedly started it all, goes unexplained. So too do repeated Swedish and Dutch defeats in the Thirty Years War. Since Roberts' essay was published, debates have flourished over what early modern military changes consisted of, how quickly they happened, and when they happened.

The first major reformulation of Roberts' thesis came with the work of Geoffrey Parker two decades later, in his "The "Military Revolution," 1560-1660—a Myth?" published in *The Journal of Modern History* in 1976.<sup>13</sup> In contrast to Roberts' dating of the military revolution and focus on drill and tactics, Parker placed its origin in the fifteenth century, with the development of gunpowder artillery and advanced fortifications. According to him, *trace italienne* (the new style of fortification developed in Italy in the first decades of the sixteenth century) and better gunpowder weaponry tipped the balance of power in favor of the defensive. Since fortresses were now stronger and able to defend themselves actively with gunpowder artillery, sieges grew in importance. According to Parker, these sieges necessitated larger armies. Drill, which was central to Roberts' thesis, thus appears in Parker's work as a product of the real causal factor, technological change: the larger armies that were needed to take down a fortress in the new style could not be maneuvered without better discipline, while drill was also necessary to handle gunpowder small arms.

As Rogers pointed out, the fact that this article was published in the prestigious mainstream *Journal of Modern History* signified the wide relevance of the concept of the

---

13 Geoffrey Parker, "The "Military Revolution," 1560-1660--a Myth?" *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Jun., 1976) pp. 195-214

Military Revolution.<sup>14</sup> The following decade would see a flurry of publications on this topic. In 1985 alone, David Parrott published an important critique of the military revolution thesis, in which he argued that the tactical reforms lauded by Roberts were in practice nearly irrelevant to the battles after the Swedish invasion of Germany;<sup>15</sup> J.R. Hale devoted the chapter of a book to what he called the “Military Reformation;”<sup>16</sup> and John Lynn argued that the French developed the small tactical units and linear infantry formations characteristic of Roberts’ Military Revolution independently of the Dutch and Swedish.<sup>17</sup> In 1986, Simon Pepper and Nicholas Adams offered a micro-study of the impact of modern fortifications as seen in the case of the early sixteenth-century conflict between Sienna and Florence. Illustrating the wide relevance of the military revolution, this delicate work was carried out from the perspective of the history of architecture, and one of its goals was to teach art or architecture historians to “read” and interpret functional works like fortresses within the context of their use.<sup>18</sup>

The high point of all this effort was the publication of Geoffrey Parker’s 1984 Lee Knowles lectures on military science as *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800*, in 1988. This work expanded on Parker’s earlier article to cover topics like developments in naval technology, as well as developments in areas outside the “heartland” of the military revolution such as England or Eastern Europe. In order to prove his contention that the driving force behind these changes was technological advance, rather than culturally specific factors such as a fascination with Greco-Roman antiquity, Parker also

---

14 Clifford J. Rogers. “The Military Revolution in History and Historiography,” in *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe*, Westview Press, 1995, p.4

15 David A. Parrott. “Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty Years’ War: The ‘Military Revolution,’” in *Militärsgeschichte Mitteilungen*, 38/2 (1985)

16 J.R. Hale, *War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450-1620*, Fontana, 1985

17 John A Lynn, “Tactical Evolution in the French Army, 1560-1660,” *French Historical Studies* XIV, 1985

18 Simon Pepper and Nicholas Adams, *Firearms and Fortifications: Military Architecture and Siege Warfare in Sixteenth Century Siena*, University of Chicago Press, 1986

included a treatment of the musket drill instituted by the Japanese feudal lord Oda Nobunaga, which anticipated Maurice of Nassau's reforms by more than a decade and was history's first recorded example of the countermarch.<sup>19</sup> Parker concludes by arguing that the key to Westerners' success in creating the world's first global empires between 1500 and 1700 lay in the complex of advancements in war-making ability known as the Military Revolution, thus tying military history to global history.<sup>20</sup> *The Military Revolution* won not only the Best Book Award of the American Military Institute, but—more significantly for the reception and relevance of the Military Revolution thesis—the Dexter Prize for the best book on the history of technology published between 1987 and 1990.<sup>21</sup>

During the following decade, historians continued to discuss and debate the Military Revolution. Jeremy Black has criticized Roberts' focus on the century from 1550 to 1600, as well as his valorization of linear tactics, demonstrating that victory in this period tended to go to the larger or more experienced army regardless of tactics.<sup>22</sup> Other historians have argued for the existence of several military revolutions.<sup>23</sup> When the size of armies increased, and whether this was a steady increase, have also been debated, most notably by John Lynn. According to Lynn, army size in France did not steadily increase but rather responded to the exigencies of warfare: it remained almost static from 1445 until the early 17th century, expanding rapidly only in 1635, climbing during the late 1630s, whereupon it sank again between the late 1630s and the Dutch

---

19 Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800*, 1988.

20 *The Military Revolution*, 4

21 "The Military Revolution in History and Historiography," 5

22 *A Military Revolution? Military Change and European Society, 1550-1800*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1991, 12-13

23 Clifford Rogers, "The Military Revolution of the Hundred Years' War," in *The Military Revolution Debate*, 1995



War, then climbed again for the Nine Year' War and the War of Spanish Succession.<sup>24</sup>

Meanwhile, while addressing the crucial importance of firearms (indeed; he believes that early modern firearms were far more lethal than most other historians do, arguing that they were adopted because of this greater effectiveness)<sup>25</sup> David Eltis retained Roberts' emphasis on the Military Revolution as an advancement in drill and discipline, but pushed the time of that advance backward about half a century. In this unique work, Eltis argued that classical influence was widespread in European armies before Maurice of Nassau, that early modern formations required extensive drill to properly maneuver, and that classically-influenced programs of drill, discipline, and order were well-known to sixteenth-century officers and sergeants.<sup>26</sup> This work raises important questions about the nature and timing of the changes I am interested in, for if Eltis is correct, the difference between the sixteenth century military and that of the late seventeenth century is not the kind or intensity of drill, but who promulgates it and who controls the army.

Despite their differences of opinion, almost all the works produced in the 1980s and early 1990s on this topic share a common assumption that the Military Revolution, whatever or whenever it was, entailed a change from older practices and technology to newer practices and technology, and that this change constituted progress, a real improvement in war-making ability. In contrast, many works published on early modern military history in the past decade focus more on the complexity of historical change than on advancement or progress. These works have revealed the extent to which military developments during the early modern period were multi-

---

24 "The *trace italienne* and the Growth of Armies: the French Case" in *The Military Revolution Debate*, 1995, and *Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army, 1610-1715*, 2006. On a related note, Philip Contamine argues that the essential difference between late medieval and early modern armies was not their size but the length of time they remained at a certain size, which is a question of organizational capability.

25 David Eltis, *The Military Revolution in Sixteenth-Century Europe*, Tauris and Company, 1998 (original pub. 1995), 13-16

26 *Ibid*, 25-26, 54-66

stranded, characterized as much by legacies of past practices as by innovation. Interestingly, many of these works, even when they cover the sixteenth or seventeenth century, avoid the phrase “Military Revolution.”

For instance, Peter Wilson's recent *magnum opus*, *The Thirty Year's War: Europe's Tragedy* (2009) used the term “military revolution” only once in a book of almost a thousand pages, and when he discusses the concept at all it is to downplay its significance as a single, well-defined event. Wilson maintained that Western European models were not always relevant to Central and Eastern Europe, and in the sphere of drill and tactics, he asserted that the intricate sequences of movements found in period drill manuals did not reflect actual practice in the field, and maintained, in contrast to Roberts' presentation of Spanish tactics, that the *tercio* remained a viable—indeed, preferable—tactical option throughout the Thirty Years' War.<sup>27</sup> Meanwhile, Lauro Martines' *Furies* discards the entire concept of “progress” when discussing military financing or logistical organization during this period, instead repeatedly pointing out that no state during this period was financially equipped to wage war without at least going into debt, that armies routinely starved in the field, and that few battles during this period were politically decisive. There is no revolution in tactics here, merely a welter of suffering.<sup>28</sup>

The works of John Lynn and David Parrott are of particular interest here, since they challenge the concept of early modern state development found in the “military revolution” thesis, in which private military enterprise was simply replaced by state control. In contrast, Lynn describes the French army from Louis XIII onward as a “state commission army,” in which commissions were sold to officers who raised troops on their own, thus replacing independent contractors with domestic contractors in the form of nobles. Agents of the state supervised this

---

27 Peter Wilson. *The Thirty Years' War: Europe's Tragedy*, Belknap Press, 2009, 84-90

28 Lauro Martines, *Furies: War in Europe, 1450-1700*, Bloomsbury Press, 2013

process, but private military enterprise was not done away with.<sup>29</sup> Meanwhile, David Parrott, in *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (2012), has argued that the delegation of military responsibility to private enterprise increased during the early modern period, rather than withering away in the face of the state, since by themselves, early modern states still lacked the resources to maintain troops in the field. Parrott's emphasis on mercenaries is refreshing; however, his work (and by extension, this entire recent line of thinking) has been criticized for drawing too sharp a distinction between private and public agents. After all, military activity still took place under the aegis of the state, while it is often difficult to tell where the state ends and the private sector begins—especially in the case of the nobles Lynn describes, who are French nobles working for the king of France. As Neil Younger pointed out, this line of thought may ultimately be more about the nature of the state than about its extent.<sup>30</sup> Meanwhile, Mousnier demonstrated that the sale of offices, while being a way for the crown to make money, and disperse the cost of running the state, also tied nobles to the central authority of the crown. While this practice was a sign of the non-modernity of the early modern French state, since the king could not rule without conciliating his most powerful lords, in theory at least royal authority remained absolute rather than contractual. Venality and the hiring of mercenaries may have had certain structural similarities, but they are not the same thing.

Parrott and Lynn stress the importance of private enterprise in general, in areas such as hiring and equipping troops, logistics, food and equipment, and financing campaigns. However, while they describe military enterprise, and soldiers who serve for pay rather than patriotic sacrifice and are thus “mercenary” in a broad sense, their analysis does not deal with mercenary

---

29 *Giant of the Grand Siècle*, especially 7-9

30 Neil Younger, review of *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe*, (review no. 1367), <http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/1367> Date accessed: 2 April, 2013

bands specifically, with the self-governing, self-conscious independent military contractors and their men who (I suspect) trained and governed one another according to an older standard of behavior. And this practice did decline after the Thirty Years' War: later examples of trade in troops or soldiers serving in foreign armies for pay are not mercenary bands in structure, but armies of the *ancien regime* which merely happen to be bought and sold, in a practice over which many of them, such as Hesse's famous "mercenaries," had very little control.

A different picture is provided by Jan Willem Huntebrinker's recent book (2010) *"Fromme Knechte" und "Garteteufel: Söldner als soziale Gruppe im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert.* Huntebrinker divides this work between descriptions of mercenaries from outside, primarily in ephemeral literature; movements of mercenaries between their society and the outside world, grounded in an archival analysis of passports; and a theoretical reconstruction of mercenaries' conception of themselves, as demonstrated in their contracts and regulations and gleaned from military legal documents. According to Huntebrinker, civilians perceived mercenaries as a threatening and licentious "anti-culture," whose vastly different attitudes toward ostentation, theft, and sexual behavior represented the opposite of the early modern German complex of virtues (hard work, thrift, continence, etc), while soldiers were could also be seen by outsiders as exemplars of loyalty, duty, service to the fatherland, and submission to God in a violent world. However, it appears that Huntebrinker takes these virtues too much for granted; considering that many men cycled into and out of the army, the military seems less like the opposite of everything early modern Germans held dear, and more like a socially marginal occupation in which license was expected. Moreover, the actual prevalence of hard work, thrift, and continence among the German populace remains far from self-evident, with the very vehemence of authority figures' stress on these virtues a measure of the extent to which they were often not practiced. As

Sabeian's work points out, peasant life is no stranger to hatred, license, and violence. If the military is an "anticulture," it is an anticulture which shares and exaggerates a side of life which may have been familiar to all, but which civilians might have preferred not to acknowledge.

Huntebrinker concludes by hypothesizing that period military theorists advocated year-round service and regular drill in order to tame the mercenary anti-culture: if regiments were not disbanded, for instance, *Gartemenschen* (out-of-work mercenaries) would no longer loiter around in the off-season begging and doing odd jobs.<sup>31</sup> While Huntebrinker's work is somewhat thin, lacking the intensive engagement with social life and mentalities that a larger work might have contained, it offers a powerful counterargument to most discussions of the military revolution: discipline and drill were advocated at once because they were more militarily effective and because they were more moral, inasmuch as they were supposed to foster qualities which these theorists valued while restraining ones they did not. However, this remains a guideline for further exploration, as "*Fromme Knechte*" und "*Garteteufel*" has no account of how these changes were implemented and received.

Here, Huntebrinker's work touches on the realm of social discipline. It is notable that the originator of the concept of social discipline, Gerhard Oestreich,<sup>32</sup> grounded it to a great extent in the military sphere. According to Oestreich, the seedbed of social discipline was the Neo-Stoic body of work of the Dutch Humanist writer Justus Lipsius (1547-1606), which advocated constancy, immovable strength of mind, patience, and quietness in the face of tumultuous events. These works were enormously popular, inspiring Grotius and remaining a basis for German

---

31 "*Fromme Knechte*" und "*Garteteufel*," Section V

32 *Neostoicism and the Early Modern State*. This book is a collection of essays originally written in the 1960s and revised later. While these essays deal with the rise of the state as well as the philosophy of Neostoicism, it was only as the author was in the process of revising them for publication as a single book that he really elaborated the connections between them, becoming convinced that Neostoicism supplied some of the ideological foundations of the state. He died before he could finish the revision, leaving the first half of the book the most finished (copyright 1981) and the latter half more or less unchanged (copyright 1969).

letters until the eighteenth century. Anticipating later discussions of social discipline, Oestreich argues that the aim of Neostoicism was to increase the power and the efficacy of the state by an acceptance of the central role of force and of the army. At the same time, Lipsius's philosophy demanded self-discipline and the extension of the moral education of the army to the whole people, who would be called upon to a life of frugality, obedience, dutifulness, and hard work. The result of this line of thought was an enhancement of social discipline in all areas of life, which, in an argument reminiscent of Foucault, produced a change in the ethos and self-perception of the individual.

Lipsius repeatedly relied on military metaphors to bring his point across, comparing the virtues he prized to the virtues of soldiers--idealized Classical soldiers, rather than the mercenaries of contemporary Europe. He also discussed military theory, such as the distinction between just and unjust warfare and the necessity of good discipline. These works had a concrete impact on the military revolution, helping to shape the Dutch military reforms.<sup>33</sup> At least for Oestreich, therefore, one of the central ideological contributions to early modern social discipline was a military philosophy. In general, social disciplining is a military concept: not only were state bureaucracy, people-monitoring, and taxation driven by the necessity to raise funds for warfare, but on the theoretical level, the paradigmatic example of social disciplining (in addition to the cloister) is the military.<sup>34</sup>

Yet the military to which historians refer when they compare the subjects of social discipline to soldiers is the Dutch army, the Swedish army, to some extent the French army, or the later standing army (and behind them all, the Roman legions which served as their

---

33 *Neostoicism and the Early Modern State*. Chap. 5

34 This is in addition to more specific arguments, such as Otto Büsch's *Military System And Social Life In Old Regime Prussia, 1713-1807* (1962), in which the author argues that the almost universal mobilization of the Prussian populace and resources gave rise to a situation in which military organization merged and became identical with the social system itself., perpetuating authoritarian habits which would last into the twentieth century.

unattainable, idealized model). It is not the guild-like mercenary bands which such armies replaced, or, perhaps, from whose scattered remnants the members of such armies originally came. My work, therefore, is only in the concrete and immediate sense “about” armies. More generally, it is about cultural tenacity and how we are to describe historical change.

For many historians, the notion of progress has been central to the discussion of the military revolution. In fact, I would argue that military history is the field in which the notion of progress, or some kind of teleological explanation, is most tempting. After all, some technologies are more effective than others, objectively better at what their creators intended them to do. It is difficult to deconstruct the idea of progress with appeals to “paradigm shifts” and the like in this field, since each act of combat is also a comparison of one group’s technology with another, and an implicit verdict. However, while later equipment and practices are often more effective than earlier ones, historians have too often presented the movement from one to the other as a simple switch, glossing over the transition from one to the other, ignoring the continuities that may exist between them, or denigrating the earlier, “backward” option.

Instead of “progress,” I would advocate for the use of “adaptation” as a heuristic. Borrowed from descriptions of natural selection, I use “adaptation” to refer to the response of individuals and groups to specific challenges posed by their context. A group can become highly adapted to the challenges it faces, and as long as it faces no new challenges, it will retain the adaptations it has developed and prosper--there is no inexorable process of change. To refer to changes as adaptations remind us that there is no teleology subtending history; rather, historical processes must be understood as shaped by contingencies and reactions to those contingencies. (Thus, for instance, as Kenneth Chase has argued, while the Chinese invented gunpowder weapons by the first millennium AD, they did not develop them as far as the later Europeans did,

not because of any innate cultural resistance to guns or to innovation as such, but because early firearms were used by infantry and in sieges, and the Chinese empire at the time fought steppe nomads on horseback across vast distances--you can't load a matchlock on horseback.<sup>35</sup>) There may be long periods without change due to well-adapted practices in a static context, but there is no such thing as "backward" because we are not moving "forward"--rather, one can be well-adapted or poorly-adapted to the situations one faces. As long as a practice can win a battle, it is proper to its situation. This approach is similar to that of Gervase Phillips, who eschewed the use of the term "military revolution" altogether and argued that military developments in England and Scotland proceeded at their own pace, in response to conditions particular to insular warfare.<sup>36</sup> Beliefs and attitudes are also part of this system: people can choose to retain a practice that does not work in a new context, adapt an old practice to a new context, believe that they are adopting a useful new practice which turns out to fail, adopt a new practice for reasons other than battle-winning capability, be forced to adopt a new practice by their authorities, or resist such coercion. The notion of adaptation provides a useful lens for looking at technological change, of which military change is a part. It reminds us that we should not speak of a single movement from mercenary bands to state armies, or from older pedagogy to drill, but examine the interaction between these complexes of ideas. In my dissertation, I plan to do so in the site where they would have been most pressing and most basic: the life and society of the regiment, of the common soldier.

### *Chapter Outline*

#### 1. The Thirty Years' War as a Time of Transition

---

35 Kenneth Chase. *Firearms: A Global History to 1700*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008

36 Gervase Phillips, *The Anglo-Scots Wars, 1513-1550*, Boydell and Brewer, 1999



I will begin in 1634, with Wallenstein's death. Wallenstein is the exemplification of the potential power of the mercenary leader, but also the threat that independent armies were thought to pose. This section will probably rely on secondary sources or printed materials, such as contemporary political theory. Perhaps a very small treatment of the contemporary view of Wallenstein, but period representations of soldiers and military enterprisers have been handled elsewhere. My central point is that after this period, the time of the military enterpriser as an independent agent has passed.

The latter half of the Thirty Years' War, contrary to popular perception, is characterized by a decline in army size. Other tactical and organizational changes were also taking place: according to Wilson, after 1635 armies were smaller and more mobile, with a greater proportion of cavalry to infantry, enabling forces to more quickly respond to threats as well as live more effectively off the land and carry more supplies with them. These observations belie the popular view of the later Thirty Years War as a time of indiscriminate, metastasizing conflict, since warfare remained controlled and directed.<sup>37</sup> Regional differences also pertained from army to army. For instance, Bavaria paid its troops better than other states; less bound to the necessity of plundering for food, Bavarian armies were rather small. Were they better disciplined?

According to Parrott, the period after the Thirty Years' War is characterized simultaneously by a decline in the wages of soldiers and a drop in the number of soldiers available for hire. Potential soldiers would have been caught between the decline in population after the Thirty Years War on the one hand and the generalized bankruptcy of states on the other. I wonder why these people didn't, or couldn't, negotiate for better wages. Instead, this period is the beginning of the standing army—poorly payed, but remaining longer in the service.

---

<sup>37</sup> *The Thirty Years War: Europe's Tragedy*, 623-23

## · 2. The Individual Soldier

I plan to work from the individual soldier outwards, from his (or her) body out to familial and social relationships. The most basic and important thing to the body of the individual soldier in this period is food. In the absence of a consistent source of food from one's authorities, it is necessary to take food from civilians. How did soldiers find or steal food? Who did this? Was foraging a communal activity? How did food circulate within the regiment? To what extent was foraging replaced by consistently-supplied rations during my period? Alcohol is probably even more important as a symbol, especially in Germany where it is associated with masculinity as well as oaths and promises—thus with the public face and activity of men. If you drink to an oath, that makes it binding. Is finding alcohol different from finding food? When and how do soldiers drink? With whom do they drink? Does this change with the rise of the standing army?

The material available on these topics will probably be found in documents ostensibly dealing with other things, such as trial transcripts. My plan so far is to read as many of these as possible and sift them for details of peoples' daily lives. Moralizing literature might be another good source for information on drinking culture.

Clothing and equipment are other areas which are symbolically rich as well as functional. Uniforms, in particular, have received attention from military historians. Contrary to popular perception, many German soldiers wore uniform-colored coats prior to 1618, because they were territorial levies issued with clothing by their prince. Shortages militated against uniformity during the Thirty Years War, but since many troops were payed partly in cloth they would have continued to make “uniform” clothing for themselves.<sup>38</sup> After the Thirty Years' War, colonels in

---

38 *Ibid*, 89

many countries uniformed their men as they saw fit. Can anything about the meaning of uniforms or standard equipment to soldiers be gleaned from the sources available?

· 3. Women in the Early Modern Army: Lovers, Wives, Business Partners

The early modern army was populated by women as well as men. While all of these women were called “Huren” by outsiders, very few of them were prostitutes, being the wives of soldiers; partners in a “may marriage,” in which a couple would get together for the campaigning season; or the long-term kept women of soldiers, who would get together with one man in exchange for a cut of his plunder or pay. The role of women in early modern mercenary bands is similar to their role in early modern manufacturing; although few women fought unless helping to defend a besieged city, they were an important part of the mercenary household economy. Many support activities like cooking, washing, making clothes, and tending the sick were done by women, who were also active in foraging; the mercenary Peter Hagendorf recounts how his wife was shot at and nearly killed while harvesting the grain that grew outside a city they were besieging.

According to John Lynn's recent treatment of the subject, the decline in the number of women in the army coincides with the rise of the standing army and regular pay, since women ran what he called “the economy of plunder,” controlling the receipt and circulation of plundered goods. If this hypothesis is correct, authority figures—who had wanted to remove women from armies for decades—could only achieve this goal once soldiers no longer needed plunder to survive.<sup>39</sup> The latter part of the period I want to study also saw official attempts to police the sexuality of soldiers, such as restriction on prostitution and the prohibition of marriages.

---

39 John Lynn, *Women, Armies, and Warfare in Early Modern Europe*, Cambridge University Press, 2008

How did this decline occur? When were prohibitions on the number of women promulgated? How strictly were they enforced? How did men and women react to them? Do restrictions on the sexuality of soldiers separate them from civilian life—or, since many young men in early modern Germany would have been forbidden to marry anyway, were they extensions or reflections of civilian social discipline?

One of the questions that interests me most about this topic is that I do not know how “masculine” war is at this time, or what it would mean to call war a “masculine” affair. While violence is intimately associated in this period with images of male potency, no war took place without the involvement of women, and the camp was not a single-gender society. Meanwhile, period representations of the women who traveled with armies depict them in militarized terms; for instance, their garb looks like female versions of soldiers' outfits, they are sometimes depicted engaging in violent acts (even against the soldiers who are their partners<sup>40</sup>), or they are shown wearing swords. Considering the weight of the sword and the right to wear it as masculine symbols, this is interesting.<sup>41</sup>

According to Lauro Martines, as yet there exists no detailed treatment of the women who traveled with armies. John Lynn's *Women, Armies, and Warfare in Early Modern Europe* comes close, but most of his conclusions are conjectural, and he is reduced to wondering if they can ever be proven. Lynn's work, however, relies either on secondary sources or French archival material, and I am hoping a detailed study of early modern German archival material will illuminate both the role of women in the early modern army and the effect of their declining numbers during the period I aim to examine.

---

40 *Ibid.*, 94-101

41 B. Ann Tlusty, *The Martial Ethic in Early Modern Germany: Civic Duty and the right of Arms*, Palgrave, 2011, 124-130; Chap. 5. Interestingly enough, in Tlusty's treatment of male vs female use of weapons in personal disputes, one of the few women to use an edged weapon rather than resort to a household implement was a woman who traveled with an army. *Ibid.*, 145-158.

#### 4. Family and Friends, Comrades and Enemies

Early modern soldiers lived and worked within familial networks as well as networks of comrades. Anecdotal evidence, such as the diary of Peter Hagendorf, suggests that these familial links were important to them: for instance, Hagendorf's second wife's father was also a soldier within his regiment (he payed for the wedding), and Hagendorf and his wife's male relatives of the same age often worked together. Together, they buried his wife's mother. If there is enough material available, I hope to examine such familial links, especially in the sphere of childhood and child-rearing. Can we get an image of what I childhood in the military was like? Can we see where the sons of soldiers end up? At the very end of my period, in the French army, they frequently enlist and when they do, are given seniority equal to their age, since they "remained with the regiment" that long. What about the daughters? Do they often, like Peter Hagendorf's second wife, marry soldiers?

#### 5. Comrades and Enemies

In this chapter, I intend to examine the social networks within and across regiments. According to many military sociologists, unit cohesion, especially within small groups, is essential to a force's success.<sup>42</sup> Small groups messed and foraged together in the early modern German army: my theory is that small group cohesion was also vitally important at this time, although to my knowledge there is no analysis of this. How did these small groups function? Conversely, how did conflicts and violence within the regiment, between soldiers on the same side, take place? Over what did early modern German soldiers fight?

According to Lauro Martines, there exists as yet no study of the relationships between officers and men in the early modern period. What were relationships like between different

---

42 There have been many publications on this topic. One of the most influential is Alexander George, *The Chinese Communist Army in Action: The Korean War and its Aftermath*. Columbia University Press, 1967. .

ranks? Were officers and men tied together by preexisting links of patronage? What were the structures of authority like in the early modern army, especially at the lower level; i.e., between soldiers and NCOs or lower officers? Like the authority of the German householder, the authority of the superior can be maintained with violence—how did conflict between ranks function?

Do relationships between soldiers change in this period, as armies become more “modern”? On a macro scale, this period may see a growing distance between officers and men: does the way superiors and inferiors interact also change on a granular level?

- 4. Pedagogy in the Mercenary Band

How were new men socialized into the unit? How were mercenaries trained? Did they adopt the new drill? What were older methods of training like? According to Eltis, armies long before my period had adopted formal drill. If he is correct, the difference between the mercenary band and the standing army is not what kind of training the men receive but who controls them and how well they are payed. If he is not correct, then my period sees the rise of the new discipline. If so, was it resisted? Is it possible to tell?

This is the section I feel most nervous about, in terms of sources. While I am confident that trial transcripts and other documents will reveal glimpses of soldiers' daily lives, detailed information about pedagogical methods may be harder to come by.

- 5. Religion, Morality, and Beliefs

- 6. Combat

Fear

Wounds

The thought of death

- 6. Decline of the Mercenary Bands. Recruitment of new-style armies in the German Speaking World

## 7. Germans in the Nine Years' War

### *Method*

With the publication of his landmark work, *The Face of Battle* (1976), the military historian John Keegan called upon historians to step outside clichéd and information-light descriptions of combat on the one hand or technical and emotionless accounts on the other and attempt to approach the experience of battle. This work was published as military history as a modern sub-discipline was taking shape, and its focus on the common soldier as opposed to high strategy or politics fed into the “New Military History,” which was heavily influenced by social history. It’s possible that Keegan’s work helped shape the rebirth of military history in the years that followed. However, as John Lynn re-framed it twenty years later, Keegan’s call to attend to the experience of battle became an oblique attack on social history: Lynn described the work of social historians of the military such as Corvisier as “limited by a desire to deal with the military past in a way acceptable to current fashions in historical scholarship;” in analyzing the military as a social institution, they “neglect or even deny its essence. Ultimately, armies are for fighting, and they define themselves in combat and in preparation for combat.” Older military historians may have erred in ignoring the common soldier, and “if the field is to heed John Keegan’s challenge to paint the true face of battle, it must become more inclusive. But modern treatments of military institutions seem to err in the other direction;” that is, they are too focused on the life of the common soldier, and too inclusive of topics which are not battle.<sup>43</sup>

This claim is troublesome for several reasons. In the first place, there is no evidence that focus on the common soldier must take the historian’s attention away from combat. Secondly,

combat was not the only purpose of early modern armies—they were also intended to despoil the enemy’s territory, enforce compliance, extract resources from the population, or act as police. Moreover, Lynn’s grounding of his argument in an appeal to purpose, cause, or essence is logically weak, since the meaning of an entity (in this case, an organization) cannot simply be reduced to its ultimate end, nor is it the business of history to confine itself to that end. Does it enrich our understanding of labor conditions in 19th century Germany to be reminded that factory workers make goods for sale? I do not intend to ignore combat, but the lives of early modern soldiers cannot be reduced to battle—they also scrounged for (stole) food, got drunk, fought with each other, and raised children, to mention just a few parts of their existence.

Most problematic from a hermeneutic point of view is the view of human experience which follows from the reduction of the military to its so-called “essential” nature: if the essence of battle is combat, and if combat is thought to be fundamentally “the same” throughout time, then battle (and therefore its experience) also partakes of a common essence, beyond cultural differences. This kind of theoretically uninformed search for empathy or “experience” leads to a plea for a supposed universal human nature. For instance, Charles Carlton, in his otherwise excellent *Going to the Wars: The Experience of the British Civil Wars, 1638-1651* (1992), quotes with approval General Sir John Hackett’s remark that “the essential soldier remains the same. Whether he is handling a sling shot weapon on Hadrian’s Wall, or whether he is in a main battle tank today, he is essentially the same.”<sup>44</sup> Carlton constantly calls back between his time and the second half of the 17th century; the links he draws between one period and another are thought-provoking, illustrative, and emotionally moving, but in the hands of a lesser writer, this line of thinking can become too simplistic. What does it mean to say that a Roman manning Hadrian’s



Wall is “essentially the same” as a British soldier in a tank, if the societies in which they live, the cultures which shaped them, and the concrete circumstances of their lives are all different? Have we learned anything deep about either of them if we say that both obey their authorities and fear death, or are we, in the final analysis, making arguments we cannot prove about the human soul, which we cannot see?

I am not arguing that there is no basic human commonality, or that it is impossible to understand how other cultures operate. But the process of engaging with another way of life is not so simple these authors seem to think. Military history is by nature a comparative sub-discipline, which has long occupied itself with transnational or global concerns that other sub-disciplines came to only later. This is valuable. However, many military historians seem to ground this comparative stance on a view of what it means to understand another culture which needs more theoretical sophistication.

Despite Lynn’s dismissal of social history, I believe this sophistication can be provided by social history, as well as social anthropology. Although social history has been out of favor for the past twenty years, in contrast to Lynn’s depiction of it as faddish it remains a useful way of looking at the ways of life of ordinary people. This stance need not entail a dry or soulless approach to the material; rather, social history draws an impression of a culture from concrete conditions, everyday situations, and relationships. I might also mention that the two greatest military historians of the twentieth century, Corvisier and Redlich, used a social-history approach.

Social anthropology, on the other hand, provides a way of looking at society from the inside out as well as from the bottom up. This discipline investigates the social organization of groups of people, paying attention to customs and laws, conflict resolution, kinship and family

structure, gender relations, and so on. Since social anthropology also examines the contradictions and ambiguities of social life, it is an ideal lens through which to look at early modern soldiers, whose lives were characterized by conflict, not only in the obvious sense of combat, but between their subculture and the rest of German society and within their own ranks. Here, the work of Edmund Leach is especially interesting, since his approach analyzes cultures in terms of social change and social heterogeneity, rather than taking social stability for granted. Moreover, his painstaking approach, which eschews high theory in favor of the unpretentious accumulation of observations about real societies, appeals to me; while I have ideas about how technological change functions, I recognize that at this time in my career it would be counterproductive to allow them to obscure the data I can collect.

Anthropologists who study war, violence, or militarism regularly complain that these topics receive too little attention in their field.<sup>45</sup> While this is not precisely correct, my brief acquaintance with anthropological literature on warfare has found it rather limited. Much anthropological work on warfare has hypothesized about its origins, or its prevalence within prehistorical society. The so-called “myth of the peaceful savage,” which asserted that neither prehistoric people nor current hunter-gatherers made war and that when conflict did arise among these groups it was ritualistic rather than lethal, arose between the 1920s and 1960s, influenced by an evolutionary framework which assumed that since warfare was the scourge of the twentieth century, it must have been less lethal in the past.<sup>46</sup> Anthropological studies of warfare flourished after the 1960s, when a conflict emerged between schools of thought which held that

---

45 Hugh Gusterson, “Anthropology and Militarism,” *Annual Review of Anthropology*, Vol. 36 (2007), pp. 155-175, 156

46 Keith F. Otterbein, “A History of Research on Warfare in Anthropology,” *American Anthropologist, New Series*, Vol. 101, No. 4 (Dec., 1999), pp. 794-805, 796

band and tribal people were warlike and those who did not.<sup>47</sup> This division, which is also a division between those who believe that it is human nature to be warlike and those who believe that it is human nature to be peaceful, has continued into the present.<sup>48</sup> The prevalence or lack of warfare either in our earliest societies or in human nature itself is not a central concern for my research. Moreover, I find the distinction drawn within this conversation, between “warfare” and activities which involve the communal killing of members of an out group but are not called “warfare,” to be somewhat artificial.

Recent anthropological treatments of the military include *The Company They Keep*, by Anna Simons, and Eyal Ben-Ari's *Mastering Soldiers*. Simons's work analyzes the U.S. Special Forces (the so-called “Green Berets,” although they never use the term), covering initiation, training, family life, the tutoring of indigenous irregulars, living and working conditions (there is an entire section on the ramifications of a renovation of the S.F. office building) and unit cohesion. She concluded that the unique organizational structure of the Special Forces, in which the basic unit is a twelve-man team, most of whom hold the rank of sergeant, fosters an environment of constant low-level competition and jockeying for status. Even as the team as a whole is supposed to (and often does) function closely as a unit, frequent transfers make close friendships of two or three people undesirable, a “clique” that jeopardizes the work of the whole.<sup>49</sup> While this work presents an interesting glimpse into the lives and training of a secretive branch of the military, it is very light on theory, perhaps shaped for the broad U.S. market.

Moreover, Simons did not do her field research with people who were in combat at the time:

---

47 For instance, an influential ethnography by Napoleon Chagnon described the Yanomami people of the Amazon rainforest as an extremely violent society, both engaging in warfare and committing violence to one another (Napoleon Chagnon, *Yanomamo: The Fierce People*, Holt McDougal, 1983). However, this work proved highly controversial, and later research has refuted Chagnon's claims, pointing out that Yanomami violence is sporadic and that much of it takes place in response to the presence of the state (Lizot, Jacques. *Tales of the Yanomami: Daily Life in the Venezuelan Forest*, 1991; R. Brian Ferguson, *Yanomami Warfare: A political history*, 1995).

48 “A History of Research on Warfare in Anthropology,” 801-802

49 A.J. Simons, *The Company They Keep: Life Inside the U.S. Special Forces*, Simon and Schuster, 1997

although one of the men she studies gets shot in the neck during training, her work is not about war.

*Mastering Soldiers: Conflict, Emotions, and the Enemy in an Israeli Military Unit* is an ethnographic study of an IDF reserve infantry battalion, of which the author was an officer between 1985 and 1992. Examining the soldiers' use of language for the "meanings attached to military service," Ben-Ari identifies three military "folk models of knowledge:" the army or soldier as machine, the army or soldier as brain/thinker, and the rhetoric of emotional control. He goes on to state that the virtue of emotional control is a central element of the military's construction of masculinity, and therefore of wider Israeli society as well, which is why Israeli men continue to fulfill reserve duty obligations willingly. This book is interesting and valuable, but ultimately far too short. Moreover, it is marred by Ben-Ari's analysis of the relationship between the IDF and its enemies. He argues that since the IDF deals with enemy civilians its soldiers conflate enemy civilians and enemy combatants, leading them to deploy the rhetoric of emotional control more stringently, supposedly viewing violence against civilians as aberrant. In addition, IDF soldiers supposedly regard enemies as well as themselves under the "machine model;" this dehumanizing view of enemy combatants is contrasted favorably with the way American soldiers in World War 2 and Vietnam supposedly demonized their enemies, and Ben-Ari concludes by stating that this mere objectification of the enemy permits a more rational attitude.<sup>50</sup> These assertions are not borne out by the evidence. Moreover, although Ben-Ari's contention that the Israeli army thinks of its enemies similarly to the way it thinks of itself is interesting when compared to the early modern situation, his observations may not be generalizable to a situation in which the division between ally and enemy is often fluid.

---

50 Eyal Ben-Ari, *Mastering Soldiers: Conflict, Emotions, and the Enemy in an Israeli Military Unit*. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1998

Meanwhile, John Hawkins's *Army of Hope, Army of Alienation* is an ethnographic study of American soldiers and their families stationed in Germany between 1986 and 1988. Here, Hawkins states that the “American ideals” of the soldiers, which included the valorization of independence and the freedom of choice, conflicted with the Army's ideals of conformity and obedience, which soldiers and their families often denigrated, ironically, as “communist.” Conflicts such as these, as well as the isolation often-monolingual Americans felt in Germany, contributed to the atmosphere of alienation Hawkins identified as characteristic of the forward-deployed army at this time. Most serious is the gulf between soldiers' expectation of a relationship between themselves and the army in which the army would provide benefits and care in exchange for services rendered, and the reality, in which the Army failed to live up to its side of the bargain.<sup>51</sup> This analysis of cultural alienation and implicit contracts has obvious parallels with the early modern army.

However, I suspect that the works which will be most valuable to me as inspiration will not be studies of the military at all, but anthropological analyses, which seem more in-depth than the works on the military I have read so far. Here, Michelle Rosaldo's *Knowledge and Passion: Ilongot Notions of Self and Social Life* is especially compelling. This work is concerned with the relationship between ways of talking about experience and the organization of experience, as well as with social inequality. The author's avenue into these issues is the practice of headhunting, recently given up among the Ilongot, but once the core of Ilongot male identity. Rosaldo asserts that two concepts, “knowledge” and “passion,” are central to understanding the way Ilongot discuss their own behavior. Both have their focus in the “heart,” “the source of

---

51 John Hawkins, *Army of Hope, Army of Alienation: Culture and Contradiction in the American Army Communities of Cold War Germany*. University Alabama Press, 2005

action and awareness, and a locus of vitality and will.”<sup>52</sup> Passion is seen in a person hard at work, in the drive to compete, and in the focused power of magical spells. Its tense beauty, manifest in dances, is echoed in bright sharp things, like the hornbill earrings worn by a young man who has already taken heads. It is what the Ilongot say makes them kill. Passion characterizes young men, who discharge their passion when they go on a raid, kill someone, cut off their head, and throw it to the ground. Knowledge, on the other hand, is seen primarily in old men, and it restrains and tempers the passion of the young. Its most characteristic display is in oratorical competitions. As well as explaining why the Ilongot kill, these emotions help explain the inequalities between men and women on the one hand, and old and young on the other.

Although the parallel between Filipino tribespeople and early modern Germans should not be overdrawn, Rosaldo's dense, nearly microscopic descriptions of Ilongot society and actions—especially those actions which seem most alien or abhorrent to us—are an excellent model for the description and analysis of early modern soldiers, for whom potency was also linked to the ability to kill. Rosaldo's approach is far more vivid than that of any of the anthropological works cited here which specifically describe the military. One review cited Malinkowski's formula of grasping “by what these people live,” as well as the title of a *Festschrift* for Evans-Prichard, *The Translation of Culture*, to show the family of approaches from which Rosaldo drew.<sup>53</sup> Approaches like these seem like they would be a good model for my work as well.

### Sources

---

52 Michelle Rosaldo, *Knowledge and Passion: Ilongot Notions of Self and Social Life*, Cambridge University Press, 1980, 36

53 *Knowledge and Passion: Ilongot Notions of Self and Social Life*. by Michelle Z. Rosaldo. Review by: Andrew Strathern. *Man*, New Series, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Mar., 1983), p. 229

Most of my subjects were illiterate as well as highly mobile, requiring me to adopt a wide-ranging and voracious approach to sources. Since they did not leave many texts themselves, I must hunt for soldiers in the texts of others, such as the records of their superiors or religious authorities, trial transcripts and court documents, city population records, memoirs and so forth. Documents like these are valuable for more than what they were simply intended to record, and painstaking attention to them will reveal information which, while it may have been incidental to the matter at hand, will illuminate the lives of soldiers and their families.

This summer, I traveled to the Oesterreichisches Staatsarchiv in Vienna, the Stadtarchiv Konstanz in Konstanz, and the Saeschisches Hauptstaatsarchiv in Dresden, and my forthcoming research will build on this work. The Oesterreichisches Staatsarchiv contains records of the Holy Roman Empire's administration, and the holdings are extensive but poorly organized. While this archive was hard to navigate for a beginner, it probably contains more valuable material than I was able to find during the short period of time that I was there. While Vienna's Kriegsarchiv has little material from before the establishment of a standing Austrian army, its holdings from the late 17th century onward are extensive.

Konstanz serves as a representative for German towns: most of the scans I made at Konstanz came from their court, containing records of disputes between soldiers and civilians, fights, and so forth, and most good-sized German towns and cities have similar material. Like many cities on the Rhine, Konstanz also had a garrison in it after the Thirty Years' War. While disputes between soldiers and civilians were handled by city courts, most of the records of which remain in the cities themselves, disputes between soldiers would have been adjudicated by the regimental courts, the records of which are harder to find.

The Saeschisches Hauptstaatsarchiv in Dresden proved the most fruitful. In addition to being almost unexplored by Westerners until recently, Dresden's early modern holdings are unusually extensive, including material from the sixteenth century as well as the seventeenth. The Saeschisches Hauptstaatsarchiv also contains documents from a nearby garrison, as well as regimental judicial records. Dresden not only seems to have had the most material in it, it also had the most interesting material. I was also able to make contact with Dr. Katrin Keller, a specialist in Saxon history who works at the University of Vienna; not only has she been helpful, she has put me in contact with a specialist in the history of Hesse; according to him, Hesse has rich early modern holdings as well.

Unlike the archives of some other countries such as France, German archives are quite heterogeneous, with each archive having its own system of classification; the smaller archives often do not have finding aids available online. However, many city or state archives have militaria, which will be my main focus, and all of them have criminal records. According to Michael Hochedlinger, director of the early modern holdings in Vienna's Kriegsarchiv, no chaplains' records from the period survive in Austria, but I am still holding out hope for Germany.

In addition to unpublished sources, many diaries and memoirs from this period have been published, providing a valuable supplement to archival work. In addition, period works of military theory, fiction, and popular literature such as sermons or broadsheets, all of which provide different views of soldiers, are widely available, either as edited reprints or digitized. As far as secondary sources are concerned, studies of landsknechts and Swiss *Reiseläufer* often provide vivid details, and nineteenth or early twentieth century historiography may make use of material that has since been lost.



