Web 2.0 and Public Diplomacy

Hannes R. Richter

University of Innsbruck

The effectiveness of public diplomacy is measured in minds changed,

not Dollars spent or slick production packages.

- Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

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Introduction

Scholarly interest in the role of the Internet and its applications in political communication has been growing rapidly over the past years and has reached ultimate prominence with the presidential campaign of Barack Obama. The web's role in international political communication and specifically as a tool of public diplomacy only recently began capturing wider audiences. Particularly with the rise of the social web and prominent applications like *Facbook* and *Twitter*, scholars and practitioners of public diplomacy alike became interested in how those tools can be used in the practice of public diplomacy. Recent developments have brought Twitter to the forefront of the debate; events surrounding protests in the aftermath of the Iranian election in what has been called the *Twitter Revolution* (e.g. Berman 2009) have been more and more communicated through *tweets* and other new media channels than the regular media. This comes as no surprise as the Iranian regime tried to hinder communications and reporting on the events to the outside world, but (so far) did not manage to get a full handle on these new communication channels. The importance of the new tools has been recognized by government officials on numerous occasions; Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asked Twitter to postpone system maintenance so Iranians could continue to feed information through it (Shater 2009). At the same time, critical voices, too, cast doubt on the true impact of the tool despite the hype. Joel Schectman (2009) argued that simply not enough Iranians were able to use Twitter in order to reach critical mass to actually fuel the protest, pointing out that the service has not yet operated a Farsi version. In addition, the Iranian government made efforts to block access to the site, which would shrink the number of Iranian users further, meaning that

only the tech-savvy would know how to bypass such a blockage through the use of proxy addresses (Schectman 2009).

These and other developments and media frenzies have also brought attention to other uses of new media in international relations. Particularly, the U.S. State Department has made every effort to improve their Web 2.0 smarts as part of their public diplomacy strategy. Embassies around the globe have begun embracing the new tools, set up Facebook pages and Twitter accounts to communicate with their audiences. I believe that these activities warrant closer observation. In the following pages, I will (1) aim to review the latest uses of Web 2.0 uses in public diplomacy, focusing on the state actor, here limited to the United States, (2) address obstacles and possibilities in assessing and measuring such efforts, and (3) suggest avenues for further research, drawing on evidence from the United States in absence of international data. This paper is thus intended as a small step towards a systematic, scholarly analysis of the effects of Web 2.0 as a tool of public diplomacy on audiences.

Public Diplomacy into the 21st Century

Public diplomacy has been long on the agenda of nation states as a tool of their foreign policy, albeit not always under that name. The term public diplomacy is a relatively new one, coined in 1965 at the Fletcher School for Law and Diplomacy by Edmund Gullion (Malone 1988; for a good overview of public diplomacy research see Cull 2008). The concept itself, however, dates back to ancient times – the Roman Empire was concerned with image and reputation and invited future foreign leaders to be educated in

Rome. In Egypt, Napoleon wanted the entire French army to convert to Islam in order to help establish French rule (Murphy 2008). In the 20th century, propaganda was already omnipresent and its importance duly noted. In World War I, Woodrow Wilson created the *Committee on Public Information* as an independent U.S. government agency in 1917, shortly after declaring war on Germany. Tasked with winning public support for the war among an mostly isolationist American public, the Committee made use of all technology available at the time – film, radio, posters, etc. – to disseminate messages and also enlisted tens of thousands of volunteers – the Four Minute Men- to speak publicly and at events. It also fabricated horror stories about German soldiers, depicting them as monsters who bayonet babies. However, while tasked with winning public support at home, the committee also began targeting audiences abroad (Creel, 1920, Cornbise 1984). During World War II, both Germany and the Allies stepped up propaganda efforts, again targeting both domestic and foreign audiences in order to rally support for the War effort at home and to frame minds abroad. Technology has always played a significant role in the trade of public diplomacy and propaganda. In the Third Reich, Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels made every effort to bring all media outlets under his control and quickly realized the potential of new modes of communication. The *Volksempfänger* was an attempt to produce an affordable radio receiver so ultimately every German household would have one and thus could receive propaganda from the airwaves. Mobile movie screens mounted on trucks attempted to bring the propaganda on film into remote areas of Germany that did not have movie theatres (for a discussion of German WWII propaganda, see e.g. Welch 1983).

In the United States, the Federal Communications Commission had established the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service (FBMS) at the request of the State Department before the attack on Pearl Harbor (Richelson 1999). The division originally was tasked with analyzing foreign short-wave broadcasts (Barnouw 1968). In 1942, the Office of War Information organized *Voice of America*, the official external radio and broadcasting service of the United States, which still operates today. Voice of America claimed to report the truth to its audiences, which reached from Great Britain to Europe, and North Africa to Japan and the Pacific theatre, stating that “we bring you Voices from America. Today and daily from now on, we shall speak to you about America and the war. The news may be good for us. The news may be bad. But we shall tell you the truth.” (William Harlan Hale, first VOA broadcast, quoted in Heil 2003, p. 32). After World War II, Voice of America, a formidable tool of public diplomacy, continued to operate as part of the State Department. During the bipolar world of the Cold War, the idea of winning hearts and minds again moved center stage, and Voice of America was regarded as a vital ingredient in countering communist propaganda. Consequently, Voice of America began broadcasts in Russian as early as 1947 (Whitton 1951). In 1951, the United States finally created what would become its premier public diplomacy agency, the *United States Information Agency*. The agency described itself as “an independent foreign affairs agency supporting U.S. foreign policy and national interests abroad, USIA conducts international educational and cultural exchanges, broadcasting, and information programs.” (Electronic Research Collection of historic State Department materials 2010). During the Cold War, the USIA was the primary strategic and organizational vessel for U.S. public diplomacy. The agency was dissolved

into the U.S. Department of State on October 1, 1999 (Kiehl 2009). In a post 9/11 world, more emphasis has again being put on public diplomacy as a tool of national security. Ever since, and particularly after the attacks of September 11, voices have called for a reorganization and modernization of public diplomacy as a tool of U.S. foreign policy; some would like to see the USIA come back into existence. However, as observers of U.S. diplomacy pointed out, the international stage has changed significantly since the days of the USIA, which was founded in the bipolar world of the Cold War. As Kiehl (2009) noted, today's public diplomacy is "field-driven and encourages egalitarianism, risk-taking and transparency" (p.48). These new qualities and requirements of public diplomacy beg the inclusion of new tools that promise to deliver just that. Social networking applications in recent years have taken the domestic political scene in the United States and elsewhere by storm; however, applications in international political communication have been lagging until recently. Public diplomacy officers have come to realize that a new international environment poses new challenges, not only from a strategic perspective, but also in terms of communications. The importance of people-to-people communications has again moved center-stage when it comes to communicating values to foreign publics while aiming to correct misperceptions; today's public diplomacy requires "a sophisticated form of triangulation: diplomats from sending states use dialogue, image projection, reputation management, and the power of attraction to connect directly with foreign populations—opinion leaders, NGO representatives, businesspeople, journalists, and others—in order to advance their objectives with host governments." (Copeland 2009). These objectives must now be met through adapting to the changing information environment of the 21st century.

U.S. Public Diplomacy and New Media

Technological advances have always been adapted very quickly by makers of propaganda. From the printing press to radio, film, and television: each left its mark on how governments have communicated with foreign audiences. Today, we are again presented with massive technological advances that will substantially alter the way we communicate and collaborate, thus also affecting the way foreign ministries communicate with "more connected, yet more diverse and fragmented, domestic and global publics" (Potter 2008, p. 121).

The Rise of the Social Web

The social web, often referred to as Web 2.0, is made up by a second-generation set of software applications, enabling users to collaborate, work, and share online. It is characterized by popular web applications such as *YouTube, Facebook, Twitter*, *Wikis*, and a myriad of others. The exact definition of the term remains somewhat contested – it likely goes back to 2004 as Paul Graham reports that he first heard the phrase "Web 2.0" in the name of the Web 2.0 conference in 2004. At the time it was supposed to mean using the web as a platform, which he took to refer to web-based applications (Graham 2005). For the purpose of this paper I will focus on two of the most prominent of these applications, Facebook and Twitter.

Facebook was founded in February 2004 and describes itself as a "social utility that helps people communicate more efficiently with their friends, family, and co-workers" (Facebook 2010). Facebook today has some 500 million users, 70% of those reside outside

the United States. More than 50 million users log on to Facebook any given day, each one of them on average is connected to 130 friends . There currently exist over 3 million active pages, 3.5 million events are created each month, and users upload some three billion photos to the site every month. What is more, Facebook reports that the average user spends more than 55 minutes per day on Facebook, a fairly long time by web standards. Facebook has seen tremendous international growth and as a result now offers the site in over 70 languages. This international presence and growth is important for those who consider Facebook as a tool for public diplomacy. Table 1 summarizes the 20 countries with the highest increase of Facebook users between 2008 and 2009. Within a year's time, Indonesia saw a staggering 2997.2% increase in Facebook users, going from just 209,760 to 6,496,960 accounts, followed by Romania, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, who saw equally dramatic increases. Those figures are impressive and leave little doubt about the fact that such tools have grown into a force to be reckoned with.

[Table 1 about here]

Twitter describes itself as a "real-time information network powered by people all around the world that lets you share and discover what's happening now" (Twitter 2010). Similar to Facebook, Twitter's growth rates, too, now continue to come from abroad. Overall, the service enjoyed an increase of 58.4 unique visitors worldwide between August and September 2009 alone, which translates into a 949% jump, while the number of U.S. visitors has remained relatively flat during the same time at 20.9 million. In March 2009, Twitter grew by 1,382% compared to the previous year, Adam Ostrow (2009) reported. These numbers underline the claim that the Internet revolution is far from over, but rather is

picking up steam. Specifically, new data from 2010 again underlines the international outreach: As of January 2010, Brazil accounts for 8.8% of all Twitter users, as compared to 2.2% in June of 2009. Likewise, Indonesia's Twitter users increased to 2.5% of the total, up from 0.5%, followed by Germany (Sysomos 2010). Governments will have to continue to cope with this significantly altered media landscape on many levels, including their public diplomacy activities.

Keeping the stipulations of new public diplomacy in mind, the social web seems to fit the description well. The new web fosters interaction, as it has grown interactive itself. It encourages dialogue; never before has it been easier to disseminate messages for governments at a dramatically reduced cost, but at the same time, recipients of these messages have the ability to directly respond with just a mouse click. The new web is viral, messages are forwarded, reposted, and retweeted. As a result, "international communication, which since the dawn of the motion picture has been premised on a one-to-many broadcasting model, is now moving ineluctably towards a web-enabled many-to-many format" (Potter 2008, p. 123). It thus seems the web can serve as a power tool for diplomats for every one of their objectives.

With the increase of social media use worldwide, the way people receive information changes substantially. The World Internet Project (2009) reports several key indicators that impact public diplomacy online: First, respondents in all countries covered[1] by the report indicate that the Internet is an important or very important source of

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[1] Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Macao, Mexico, New Zealand, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, United Arab Emirates, USA.

information. What is more, in all countries except for Macao and Sweden, respondents "ranked the Internet as an important or very important source of information compared to television, newspapers, and radio" (World Internet Project, 2010, p.2), albeit reservations about its reliability.

Data from the United States reinforce the trend towards the political web: In 2008, political use of social networking sites was already significant, particularly among the younger generation (see Table 2): 37% of 18-29 year old social network users reported that they discovered political interests or affiliation of friends, 28% indicated they received campaign information from such sites, and some 15% said they started or joined a political group. Given the rapid growth of these networks particularly outside the United States, their future impact as a tool for public diplomacy cannot be underestimated.

[Table 2 about here]

As a result, the U.S. State Department has increased its efforts to adapt to the changing environment while at the same time being confronted with possible pitfalls: "how should diplomats engage with the new media, can diplomats blog? Twitter? Should comments be allowed? Should they be filtered? Who can engage? Where? For what purpose?" (Graffy 2009). The Department started a blog, *DipNote*, while beginning to venture into social media. Soon it had created a digital outreach team able to communicate not only in English, but also in Urdu, Farsi, and Arabic to enter the blogsphere to counter misinformation about U.S. foreign policy and the U.S. in general. (Graffy 2009). Within the U.S. State Department, the emphasis that is now being put on new media is evident on

several levels: a new generation of Foreign Service officers is advocating changes and possibilities within the Department and its missions abroad that involve a Web 2.0-savy approach next to structural changes (Public Diplomacy Front Line Working Group 2009). The Department since has pushed its efforts towards a digital future. Next to a substantial redesign of its web sites (most notably its main site, www.state.gov), it also launched its own international social network, *ExchangesConnect*, in October of 2008, which encourages international users to sign up and also connects through Facebook and Twitter. The service has since enjoyed a steady increase in members (Johnson 2009). Furthermore, www.america.gov is targeted at foreign audiences and published in several languages. It's *Democracy Video Project* on YouTube marks another Web 2.0 outreach, calling for user-generated video submissions on democracy.

Similarly, foreign missions and diplomats increasingly are establishing a presence on Facebook and Twitter. Table 3 summarizes a selection of U.S. missions abroad who have established a Facebook presence and the corresponding number of "Fans" (in case of a Facebook *Page*) or the number of "Members" (in the case of a Facebook *Group*). Interestingly, the country that had the largest growth rate on Facebook over the past year is also host to the U.S. Embassy currently boasting the highest number of Facebook supporters – The U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, with 30,207 fans at the time of the writing of this paper. In this ranking the U.S. Embassy in Manila comes in a distant second with 3,849 fans, followed by the embassies in Podgorica, Baghdad, and Cairo.

[Table 3 about here]

In the light of these activities, the question remains, however: does it matter? Despite the advantage the social web might have for the dissemination of information and dialogue and its structural and strategic implications, one question must be recalled at this point: does it have the power to change minds, net of other factors, or is it just public diplomacy window dressing? Not all observers share the optimism surrounding the new digital diplomacy: "so many governments manipulate the Internet to their advantage—all the while still practicing old-fashioned tactics like throwing bloggers in jail—suggests that those who hoped to use cyberspace to promote democracy and American ideals on the cheap may be in for a tough fight" (Mozorow 2009). Thus, scholar and practitioners alike must be concerned about evaluating and assessing the impact of new media to be able to answer these questions in the future.

The Quest for Assessment

Public diplomacy effects in general are hard to measure, and empirical assessment of its impact with regard to digital media is the primary concern in this paper. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the British Council have begun developing and testing an evaluation framework to assess the impact of their public diplomacy initiatives. As the authors involved in the program, Louise Vinter and David Knox point out, "there are three inherent difficulties in measuring public diplomacy: its frequently long-term ambition; the challenge of measuring concepts that may be intangible; and the problem of attributing observable changes to one's own activities" (Vinter and Knox 2009, p.163). As the authors argue, the principle problem in measuring public diplomacy is attribution: in the international environment of the 21st century, where multiple actors, both governmental and

non-governmental, influence issues and opinions, identifying the causes is a most difficult task. What is more, many objectives of public diplomacy are long-term goals, which pose additional challenges, as Nick Cull summarized: “Attempts to evaluate cultural diplomacy can seem like a forester running out every morning to see how far his trees have grown overnight.” (Cull 2007 in Vinter and Knox 2009, p. 164).

If our understanding of the goal of digital diplomacy is a mind changed, then we must focus on the individual as the unit of analysis, rather than policy outcomes. Thus, it seems in order to treat social web applications as media in an empirical sense, helping us to draw on decades of scholarship and thereby bridging the gap between existing literatures on web 2.0 in the domestic sphere and their application in international political communication. The U.S. State Department, according to Bruce Wharton, evaluates such activities “according to three criteria: reach, engagement and credibility - each of which can be measured through readership statistics and web ratings” (Wharton quoted in Johnson 2009, p. 24). I argue that with the individual as the unit of analysis, survey research would be the appropriate tool to complement such findings. Within the above framework, such an analysis would fall under impact assessment, thus delivering additional insights of the effectiveness of digital tools as part of a larger effort. I will draw on descriptive international data and present evidence from the United States, demonstrating the impact of new media during the 2008 presidential election.

Between May and June, 2009, The Pew Global Attitudes project administered a 25 country survey to investigate international attitudes towards the United States, President Obama and a number of international issues. I would like to highlight one specific aspect of

the survey to illustrate the potential of attitude shifts happening as a result of a media event. In Israel and the Palestinian Territories, respondents were polled before and after President Obama's Cairo speech, Table 3 presents the results. While 76% of Israelis indicated to have a positive view of the United States before the speech, the number dropped to 63% after the speech. Similarly, the number of Palestinian respondents indicating a positive view of the U.S. rose from 14% to 19%. Confidence in President Obama's leadership in Israel dropped from 60 to 49%, while it rose by 5% in the Palestinian Territories. While these bivariate relationships are of limited validity, they do suggest that opinions can be swayed by such messages and invite testing for such an effect in a multivariate environment. It also raises the question to what degree new media sources can have an effect on such opinions, if they contribute to learning about the U.S. and if they ultimately can support a long-term improvement of opinions about the United States. In an ideal world, data to empirically test these assumptions would be readily available, as of this point; however, I was unable to locate a dataset that allows to test a model including such specific media variables. To illustrate the case, I resorted to the United States, where such data is available, and present a multivariate model on new media usage and political knowledge as a proxy for democratic competence that can possibly serve as an example for future international testing.

[Table 4 about here]

New Media and the 2008 Presidential Election - A Domestic Proxy

In the absence of available international data, I draw on evidence from the United States regarding the impact of new media as a source of political information. The Internet today is an integral part of U.S. political campaigns. Particularly during the 2008 presidential campaign, the omnipresent web made headlines of its own (Cohn 2007, Feldman 2007, Vargas 2007); social networking and online video applications took a particularly prominent role. For the first time in history, citizens were able to submit their own questions for Democratic and Republican debates via *YouTube*, the web's most popular video-sharing platform, to have them aired and answered live on network television. This marked the latest milestone in the Internet's integration into the mainstream of political information. Similar to my question about the web's impact on foreign audiences, I ask if the Internet as an everyday reality of a majority of Americans does in fact alter political communication in the U.S. More specifically, do those who have access to the Internet and use it for political information tend to be better informed about politics, net of other factors? Does the medium increase information only among citizens who are politically aware in the first place, or does it in fact help bridge the information gap between the informed and the uninformed? Is the new medium an amplifier of existing patterns, an equalizer of existing divides, or does it have no impact at all? Visionaries of information technology and democracy have asserted that technological advances hold the potential to function as an equalizer for the disconnected: to flatten access to political information (Barber 1984, Dahl 1989, Morris 1999). On the other hand, past research has indicated that only a subset of the population benefits from the Internet politically; the focus was on the digital divide, the gap between the haves and the have-nots, denying

notions of a cyberspace revolution (Margolis and Resnick 2000). Moreover, scholars have argued that as the information revolution took hold, it helped form a new political elite rather than leveling the playing field (Hindman 2007, Coglianese 2007).

I chose political knowledge as a dependent variable as it can serve as a proxy for democratic competence. Similarly, such models can be easily adapted to test for changes in issue positions and the like. The data for this model are provided by the Pew Center for the People and the Press Biennial Media Consumption Survey 2008. The sample includes 3,600 adults, 2,800 of which were interviewed over their landline and 800 over their cell phone between April 29 and May 31, 2008. The best measurement of political knowledge has been subject to much debate and primarily revolves around the use of factual knowledge questions versus the use of the interviewer-evaluation of the respondent's political knowledge, particularly in face-to-face interview situations (Zaller 1985, 1992). The use of factual knowledge scales has been widespread; Levendusky and Jackman (2003) in their study of political knowledge measurement acknowledge it to be the most popular within the discipline (next to interviewer-evaluation), but also state that these are not immune to certain drawbacks ranging from the question whether certain factual knowledge items should be assigned weights to address questions like "should knowing the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court count more or less than knowing which party controlled the House of Representatives before the most recent election?" (p. 6). The second possible measurement relies on the interviewer's assessment of a respondent's political knowledge measured using a five-point scale. Although there is an apparent concern that these evaluations might be biased, Zaller points out that "at least in surveys involving face-to

face interviews and considerable political content, they perform extremely well […] A fear in relying upon such interviewer ratings is that they might be systematically biased in favor of higher-status persons, notably whites and males. However, I checked carefully for evidence of such bias and was able to find none."(Zaller 1985, quoted in Zaller 1992, p.338). As Levendusky and Jackman (2003) point out, the interviewer-rating measure is "arguably the strongest single-item indicator" (p. 6). In this paper, the dependent variable, political knowledge, is measured through the available three hard-knowledge questions, asking respondents to identify the political party who has a majority in the U.S. House of Representatives, the current U.S. Secretary of State, and the current prime minister of Great Britain, respectively. These were subsequently recoded into an additive knowledge scale, coded zero for respondents who answered all three questions incorrectly, 1 for one correct answer, 2 for two correct answers, and 3 if all answers were answered correctly.

The political knowledge model can be summarized as such:

$$\mathbf{Y}(\text{Knowledge}) = ß_1 + ß_2\text{Newspaper} + ß_3\text{Television} + ß_4\text{NewsRadio} + ß_5\text{Intrest} + ß_6\text{InternetNews} + ß_7\text{Blogs} + ß_8\text{Online Magazines} + ß_9\text{Social Networks} + ß_{10}\text{Age} + ß_{11}\text{Education} + ß_{12}\text{Race} + ß_{13}\text{Sex} + ß_{14}\text{Incme} + ß_{15}\text{PartyI.D.} + e$$

Where the independent variables controlling for "traditional" news outlets are *Newspaper*, which measures whether a respondent regularly reads a newspaper or not, *Television*, measured in similar fashion to capture if a respondent regularly consumes T.V. news programs, and *NewsRadio*, capturing regular exposure to radio news programs. It is

important to note that these variables provide a rather general measure of news consumption and were chosen due to their similarity in question wording in order to provide a stable basis for comparison between them. The Internet variables capture three behaviors: First, *Internet News User* is coded to summarize respondents who log on at least three times a week (or more often) to get news online; second, *Read Blogs* measures respondents who stated that they regularly read political blogs as a source of political information, and third, *Social Network* gauges respondents who do have an account with a social network site such as Facebook or MySpace. Demographic predictors of political knowledge in this model include age, education, race (coded as a white/non-white dummy), gender, and income, complimented by a control for party identification; e is the residual error term. Given the nature of the dependent variable, Ordered Probit would also be an adequate method of estimation besides OLS regression; I thus estimated the model using both techniques and did not find significant differences. For ease of interpretation, the results of the OLS regression will be presented here.

Results

The results of the multivariate political knowledge model are summarized in Table 5. Inspection of demographic standard predictors of political knowledge yields little surprise: age, education, and income are all significant and positively related to the dependent variable; they remain reliable predictors of individuals' levels of political information. Somewhat noteworthy, however, is the significant, negative effect of gender in this model; being female is negatively related to political knowledge. Race is barely significant at the .05 level, while party identification does not exercise any significant effect. Turning to the

media consumption variables, one can observe the differing impact of the news source: while regularly reading a newspaper remains a positive, significant predictor of political knowledge, the missing impact of television has again been confirmed. Respondents seem not have to learn much from the tube when it comes to politics; the variable is insignificant. However, it is important to note that this model employs somewhat generalized measures of media sources, so television overall does not contribute to political knowledge, thus confirming the television hypothesis. Refined measurement might lead to other insights, depending on what programming a respondent consumes – primarily and regularly watching political programming like C-Span is likely to have a different impact. Noteworthy seems the positive, significant impact of radio as a source of political information: respondents who claim to regularly listen to political news on the radio seem to learn more than those who regularly rely on T.V. news programs. The Internet variables yield mixed results: while going online frequently to get news clearly contributes to political knowledge, other activities do not: reading political blogs and having a social network site account like Facebook are not statistically significant; while reading political magazines like Slate online does have a significant, positive effect. Clearly, reading political magazines online potentially has more to contribute to political knowledge than uploading photos to Facebook seems obvious; yet it is also an indication that the political uses of social networking sites do potentially lie in different areas and make little contribution to levels of citizens' democratic competence. It does not quite explain, however, why reading online political magazines has a significant effect, and reading political blogs does not, while controlling for other factors.

[Table 5 about here]

These results pertain to a domestic political campaign in the United States and cannot be used to generalize to the impact of new media in other countries. I decided to include them at this point as an example from the home front and hope to be able to replicate the general idea with international data. Given the fact that we cannot assume that political behavior and information gathering habits are universally distributed around the globe, the question whether Facebook can contribute to a mind changed must be answered with great care, but ultimately we should gain better insights into how foreign publics receive public diplomacy campaigns employing new media, who they are, and if it can change their levels of knowledge and attitudes, while controlling for standard predictors. If the voice of America now is online is to be determined.

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Tables and Figures

Table 1: Countries with the Fastest-Growing Number of Facebook Users, 2009

Rank	Country	# Users July 2008	# Users July 2009	12 Month Growth %
1	Indonesia	209,760	6,496,960	2997.2%
2	Romania	9,060	230,600	2445.3%
3	Slovakia	27,960	588,860	2006.1%
4	Czech Republic	51,860	1,088,020	20005.3%
5	Italy	491,100	10,218,400	1980.7%
6	Philippines	162,640	2,719,560	1572.13
7	Argentina	417,980	4,906,220	1073.8%
8	Uruguay	40,920	395,800	867.3%
9	Taiwan	71,340	685,450	860.8%
10	Portugal	48,180	425,680	783.5%
11	Brazil	119,080	1,015,400	752.7%
12	Spain	695,900	5,773,200	729.6%
13	Paraguay	7,920	63,740	704.8%
14	Poland	83,180	619,180	644.4%
15	Bulgaria	60,240	436,480	624.6%
16	Austria	111,060	728,800	556.2%
17	Slovenia	53,740	343,320	538.9%
18	Lithuania	24,320	153,160	529.8%
19	Thailand	114,180	697,340	510.7%
20	Russia	67,760	412,840	509.3%

Source: Facebook

Table 2: U.S. Missions Abroad on Facebook ***(Selection)***

Mission	# of Fans/ Members	Mission	# of Fans/ Members
U.S. Embassy Jakarta	30,207	U.S. Embassy Nairobi	626
U.S. Embassy Manila	3,849	U.S. Embassy Harare	598
U.S. Embassy Podgorica	3,334	U.S. Embassy Nairobi	626
U.S. Embassy Baghdad	2,459	U.S. Embassy Harare	598
U.S. Embassy Cairo	2,336	U.S. Embassy Quito	545
U.S. Embassy Macedonia	2,068	U.S. Embassy Ashgabat	488
U.S. Embassy Tunis	1,896	U.S. Embassy Warsaw	447
U.S. Embassy Dhaka	1,665	U.S. Embassy Seoul	410
U.S. Embassy Kabul	1,630	U.S. Embassy Abuja	49
U.S. Embassy Tirana	1,385	U.S. Embassy Brazzaville	10
U.S. Embassy Gaborone	1,549	U.S. Embassy Mauritania	260
U.S. Embassy Santiago	1,401	U.S. Embassy Dushanbe	292
U.S. Embassy Pakistan	931	U.S. Embassy Alumni Bogota	280
U.S. Embassy Moldova	248	U.S. Embassy Dushanbe	292
U.S. Embassy Libreville	13	U.S. Embassy Vienna	281
U.S. Embassy Bridgetown	79	U.S. Embassy Italy	733
U.S. Embassy Zambia	902	U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv	158
U.S. Embassy Prague	876	U.S. Embassy Sana’a	673
U.S. Embassy London	897	U.S. Embassy Kuala Lumpur	592
U.S. Embassy Singapore	416	U.S. Embassy Almaty	91
U.S. Embassy France	1,005	U.S. Embassy Baghdad Soccer Team	31

Source: Facebook

Table 3: Political Use of Social Networking Sites in the United States 2008

	SN Users Age 18-29 (n=152)	SN Users Age 30+ (n=250)
Discovered your friends' political interests or affiliations	37%	22%
Gotten any candidate or campaign information on the sites	28	17
Signed up as a friend of any candidates	16	4
Started or joined a political group	15	4
Have you done any of these using a social networking site	49	32

N=409 social networking site users. Margin of error is +/- 5%
Source: Pew Internet & American Life Project Spring 2008 Survey.

Table 4: The Cairo Effect

	Israel		Palestinian Territories	
View of U.S.	Pre-Speech	Post-Speech	Pre-Speech	Post-Speech
Favorable	76	63	14	19
Unfavorable	22	36	84	80
Obama's Leadership	Pre-Speech	Post-Speech	Pre-Speech	Post-Speech
Confident	60	49	21	26
Not Confident	39	51	76	72
Will Obama consider our interests?	Pre-Speech	Post-Speech	Pre-Speech	Post-Speech
Yes	58	54	27	39
No	36	43	70	57
N	800	401	804	400

Source: Pew 2009 Global Attitudes Survey.

Table 5: OLS Regression Results, 2008 United States Knowledge Model

Dependent Variable: Political Knowledge			
	Coef.	**P>|t|**	**Std. Error**
Media Consumption Variables			
Newspaper*	.1115199	0.014	.045141
Television	.0795395	0.127	.0520798
News Radio***	.1662281	0.000	.041913
Enjoy Keeping Up***	.130739	0.000	.0242092
Internet News User***	.2264945	0.000	.0456112
Read Blogs	.0055485	0.787	.020548
Read Online Magazines***	.1805575	0.000	.0318495
Social Network	.0610533	0.271	.0554856
Demographic Variables			
Age***	.1692504	0.000	.0164835
Education***	.2719886	0.000	.0245368
Race*	.1070845	0.050	.0546433
Gender***	-.398015	0.000	.0413226
Income**	.0246152	0.005	0088139
Party I.D.	.0079606	0.763	.0263814

$N = 2110$
$R^2 = 0.3031$
Source: Pew Center for the People and the Press

Figure 1. The relationship between the evaluation framework and the logical framework for planning public diplomacy activity from Winter and Cox, 2008.